Poměr sil na začátku 2. sv. války

Hi,
I don't know if you are here somewhere already addressed, but does anyone have a summary or some information about it, what was the ratio of forces between the states at the beginning of the 2. world war? I mean for example how many tanks us, France, USSR ..., planes, guns, soldiers ...
Thank you.

I sa it here riešili in niekoľkých témach, minimally the relation of forces between the USSR and Nemeckom would sa put nájsť here Attack on the USSR - knew about him Stalin?, some sort of any idea as to the CZECHOSLOVAKIA - Germany here again Discussion to the topic of CZECHOSLOVAKIA, according to historians defend not.

It happened for it to determine what is actually mysleno onim "zacatkem second world war" ? The year 1938 ? Zari ? 1939 ? Success ? Zari ? tech date is quite enough, and each of them means quite vyrazny meznik necessary item in the equipment (see above zminene debate), because with obsazenim Czech pohranici and potazmo the entire Bridge was made him posileni nemecke vyzbroje, but generally it's not vnimano as valecny conflict. Dale is the beginning otevrenych battles in Poland, when I was that situation again little else ....

I mean sometimes in September 1938,when the munich agreement.

I've got just the ratio of the forces in 1939,if you want to write..

I don't want to bet grumbler, but I wrote .

I'll be glad for any information,it doesn't matter that it will be another year...

I found something on the internet,but I was wondering about the status of the other armies and I don't know how these details are true

year 1938:

PERSONS : 1 280 000 soldiers

HORSE : 217 000

Machine GUNS 40 000 (only hard)
in 1938 there were rearming of the heavy machine gun vz. 24 - Schwarzlose to a more modern heavy machine gun ZB 53 vz. 37

MORTARS : 1 167

8 cm mortar vz. 36 : 902
14 cm mortar vz. 18 : 240 from Slovakia - 24
26 cm heavy mortar vz. 17 : 25 of Slovakia - 2

ANTI-TANK GUNS : 780

3.7 cm kanon vz. 34 PÚV : 332
3.7 cm kanon vz. 37 PÚV : 458

FIELD GUNS : 2 230

3.7 cm kanon MacLean : 7 Slovakia - 7
3.7 cm cannon Puteaux : 6
6 cm shipping kanon vz. 30 : 2 Slovakia - 2
7.5 cm French kanon vz. 1897 : 38 from Slovakia - 38
7.5 cm chinese kanon vz. 14 : 6 from Slovakia - 4
7.5 cm horský kanon vz. 15 : 235 of Slovakia 112
7.5 cm kanon d/28 : 12
8cm light cannon vz. 5/8 : 86 from Slovakia - 21
8 cm kanon vz. 17 : 267 from Slovakia - 106
8 cm kanon vz. 30 : 204 from Slovakia - 14
10 cm lightweight howitzer vz. 14/19 : 605 from Slovakia 221
10 cm lightweight howitzer vz. 30 : 165 from Slovakia 32 + 21 units at the beginning of the year 1939
10 cm mountain howitzer vz. 16/19 : 44
from Slovakia 41
The 10.5 cm hrubý kanon vz. 35 : 106 from Slovakia 40
15 cm gross howitzer vz. 14/16 : 128 from Slovakia 84
15 cm gross howitzer vz. 25 : 340 from Slovakia 113
15 cm heavy howitzer vz. 15 : 43
15 cm heavy cannon vz. 15 and 15/16 : 11

THE ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS 250

7.5 cm kanon PL vz. 37 4 + additional 100 units during the year 1939 - April
8.35 cm kanon PL vz. 22 : 144 from Slovakia 29
- the most widely used PL kanon in the CS army
8 cm kanon PL vz. 5/8 : 4 in Slovakia
8 cm kanon PL vz. 14 : 3
8 cm kanon PL vz. 37 : 97 from Slovakia 1
9 cm kanon PL vz. 12/20 : 20

Anti-aircraft machine GUN (VKPL) - large-caliber machine gun against aircraft
20 mm vz. 36 : 229 of Slovakia 64

HEAVY CANNONS: 40

21 cm hard must have a mortar vz. 18 : 18
24cm heavy cannon vz. 16 : 6
30.5 cm heavy must have a mortar vz. 16 : 16

LIGHT TANKS : 350

LT vz. 35 - 298
LT vz. 34 - 50

Renault FT-17 : 1
The number of renaults was a total of 7, but in 1938 it was used as a training tank and on the list in the handover protocol in 1939, there was only one
Amphibious tank (FAQ) - prototype - 1

Lt vz. 38 he was at the stage of prototypes - at the end of 1938 to about 4 pieces of improved THNP, which the army has included in the loadout under the name of the Lt vz. 38. The initial order for 150 units at the time of the mobilization raised the number of 300. These prototypes at the end of the year they were in combat formations, but still in the factories.

ARMORED CARS : 70

Tatra Koprivnice (T-72) OA vz.30 - 51
Skoda (PA-III) OA vz.27 - 14
Skoda (PA-II) OA vz. 23 - 5
Both of these types of armored cars were obsolete and served as the training, the number of OA vz. 27 and OA vz. 23 may vary upward, but here are the numbers of the fighting OA, which could intervene in the fighting.

TANKETTE : 70

Tank vz. 33 (Heating vz. 33) - 70
This vehicle with two machine guns was really in full number utilized by our military, against infantry, however, could succeed

ARMORED TRAINS 17 (5 permanent, 12 improvised)

AIRCRAFT 950

Reconnaissance aircraft
Letov Š 328 : 338

Aero A-100 (v 1938, it was used rather to survey, but could carry bombs) : 39
Aero Ab-101 (modification of type a-100) : 60
Fighter aircraft Avia B. 534 : 443 - in the production of 72 pcs BK 534 with a cannon

WEAPONS AND the PROTOTYPES WHICH WOULD have BEEN AVAILABLE IN 1939 and in other years


CANNON:

15 cm gross howitzer vz. 37 (delivery of 186 pieces)

ANTI-TANK CANNON

Skoda 47 mm kanon P.In.In. vz. 36

TANKS

LT vz. 38 (order to 300 pieces)
ST vz. 39 (order for 400 pieces) - planned completion of the supply up to the year 1942
For tanks it is necessary to take into account that the factory had the means and the material only on 6 months of production in case of war.

AIRCRAFT
Avia BK 534 : 72 pieces of cannon version of our fighter jets

- data on heavy weapons do not count towards the armament of the fortifications.

So the ratio of forces in 1939

France-66 infantry divisions,1 tank division,0 mechanized divisions

614 fighters,170 bombers, aircraft

9 battleships,77 submarines,1 aircraft carrier


Britain-17 infantry divisions,2tanové division,0 mechanized divisions

773 fighter aircraft,1313 bomber aircraft

15 battleships,58 submarines,7 aircraft carriers


USSR-96 infantry divisions,4 tank corps,1 mechanized division

1440 jet fighter,1500 bomber planes

3 battleships,170 submarines 0 aircraft carriers


Poland-30 infantry divisions,0 armoured divisions,0 mechanized divisions

154 fighter aircraft,159 bomber aircraft

0 battleships,5 submarines 0 aircraft carriers

I'll finish the next time, now I don't have time.

Germany-86 infantry divisions,4 tank divisions,8 mechanized divisions

1174 fighter aircraft,1516 bomber aircraft

5 battle ships,55 submarines 0 aircraft carriers


Italy-40 infantry divisions,2 tank divisions,0 mechanized divisions

800 fighter aircraft,500 bomber aircraft

4 battleships,115 submarines 0 aircraft carriers.

The numbers reported by norman basically sitting. Quite accurately it is here.
http://vojenstvi.cz/armada/predvalecna/cisla/2.htm

That's what the pirate me already sitting less. Eg. germany certainly never had 5 battleships. Panzerschiffe not like battleships classify. The russians were certainly much more of the air force, etc..

I used their resources,I don't know if they are accurate,but it doesn't fit me, the number of German submarines..

Hmmm, Hrbci report to September 1939, about 60 submarines in the state. / U 1 - U 54, 56 - 61 /. That's where I'd seen this problem. For those sources I think e.g. that there is a difference between the reckoned soviet aircraft in the arsenal and the number allocated against Poland in the glow of 1939. You need to clarify what you're describing, if the complete conditions of any army, or just what really took off, or otherwise fought ..

My source was just the ratio of forces in the roce1939 nothing more bic less,I still forgot it was there also that the 12th infantry of the british divisions and 2 panzer were incomplete.

I don't know what your source is, but the british infantry division used on the continent were fully motorized (unlike the infantry divisions of the WH that were hipomobilní) so that there is a 0 divisions of the motorized is nice but a little off. Moreover, it is quite a difference between the numbers of the troops in the division in different states and times, one can hardly compare the need to the soviet division with the German, in 1939, if I remember it was the soviet division of the standard battalion of tanks (usually, it was T-26) so that only a mechanical comparison of the numbers is nonsense. Different was the firepower (given, for example, a different number of automatic weapons and guns), in addition to the game entering other thing was the logistics (need to switch to a different track gauge was quite a big problem). Comparison type number of units is thus quite misleading. Indeed, it proved in all conflicts, that the numbers may not (and usually are) be decisive. Extremely important is the vycvičenost, skills of the command staff and, of course, place and time of the encounter. If this consideration is a comparison of just the game for someone who can compare numbers, but he doesn't know what's behind them. The difference like the british divisions composed of professional soldiers and the French compound of the advances have been considerable, indeed, in retreat Dunquerku it turned out, the british in most retreated in an orderly fashion and in an orderly fashion, the French are the same thing fared much worse. Therefore, this kind of mechanical comparison is nonsense.
And battleship, even if counting on the panzerschiffe would have been in that number, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were battle cruisers, and the class of battleships were not even armour nor the caliber of guns, the Bismarck was as far as I know in 1939, still under construction, the Tirpitz was even worse in that he was running on the water but finished it was not until two years later. Moreover, even if we were both battle cruisers for the battleship, then the Scharnhorst was completed in December 1939 and Gneisenau in 1939, underwent adjustment of the bow which also knocked out of action (was taken in 1938). Even with the numbers of submarines it is somewhat uncertain, the first 30 boats it is necessary to take a lot with a grain of salt, types I and II, which is accounted for were only conditionally able to deploy and cannot be taken as a full-fledged combat ship, part of which, incidentally, served as a school ship for the training of the crews of new submarines..

Even if they take the numbers, so the division of the Red army were generally significantly smaller than the German ones (if they were both at full strength), including the amount of heavy weapons and the like, so that one German division rather match the choir of the Red army.

What is With the+G is concerned, as far as I know it was thought about converting them to something more battleships by the triple 28cm turrets were replaced by double-glazed 38cm what were even on the Bismarck and Tirpitzi, but it never happened partly because of money, partly because that's the design of the ships very well bore (just to see what they had Japonsi problems with your 203mm cruisers rebuilt from 155mm similar method)..

Ad battleships of Germany:
So as he wrote to Weld ,clearly Germany never 5 battleships not, although for some authors there is ranked With+G to battleships, but rather to simplify. That's exactly what he wrote Bitaxe, nor the caliber of the main guns, even armor with the BL equal could not, it was the classic battle cruisers.
I would amend Bitaxe, however in a few details.
Gneisenau was 01.09.1939 able to set sail on the sea, even if the combat readiness is questionable, I guess from the point of view of the crew. The redevelopment of the bow took place in January 1939, there apparently was meant Scharnshorst, which in July and August 1939 was the bow modified to the so-called Atlantic. But at the time of the outbreak of war he was already plavbyschopný and theoretically could intervene in a fight (in November 1939, he was conducting exercises near the Baltic)

But, if they were completely prepared to fight here, I guess, preparedness was a matter of days, maybe several weeks.

Panzerschiffe or how in English most often translates to "pocket battleships" (from the English naming of these ships) battleships were not - this is evidenced by their subsequent reclassification to heavy cruisers. The English is so called, firstly, a little mockingly, partly for reasons of relative helplessness, where these vessels are actually classified - the size and displacement as a cruiser, but the weapons stronger.

The Schlesien and Schleswig Holstein, as of battleships in this period perhaps no one of judgment, can not consider.

So Germany basically to 01.09.1939 BL=0.

By the way, the truth that this comparing different kvantitativnich meritek uniform is almost totally useless. Is this a total one with cim in the conflict entering, because what is important are primarily produkcni the capacity of the economy, which armada equips.

I will give the example. If eg. germany and britska armada came about 50% of their division so what plays a role is with what kind of speed they are able to these casualties to replace, with what abilities they are capable country making new technology, with what abilities are countries capable of producing weapons.

From this point of view it doesn't really matter, how were the armada's great. Somewhere I read on ekonomickych servers comparison of the so-called Powers of reproduction. Slo basically a classically economically calculation of how long and whether they country was able to generate 50% of their losses. What was interesting, from the pres all the celebrations of the German industry, was germany's economy at the very nizkem degree reproducke. Are there, of course, were Amici about this, don't doubt

By the way eg. USSR done an incredible ability to reproduce in 1941, when I came about some 60% of armada and during the year 1942 I again were back .

Thanks Tarsovi for support of my argument. Me personally don't even mind sorting class the Scharnhorst between the battleships, that is the question to disluzi, even though it was really rather a battle cruiser. What bothers me more is the simplification of. And this here pirate a little show. On the other hand, I don't know how long deals with the issue. And I remember, when I once started, I too had because of ignorance of the tendency to simplify and generalize..

Guns of 280 mm are on a battleship in 1939 really weak (they are weak in fact, even on the battle cruiser)as well as armour. The germans were aware of this and planned to equip the larger the caliber, the reason why this has not happened is probably rather that at the time when it was planned (I think 1942) was already in Germany, "the end of surface ships", because it is not able to realistically deploy due to the power of the enemy and also for lack of fuel. Because overkill has not taken place and the ship ended up only as a potential threat (the british tried to destroy by air - tied them unnecessarily forces flot). The ship originally were intended to act against the trade (i.e. typically křižníkově) and destroy the convoy, the cruisers, their guns was enough, if they hit on a battleship would be able to break away and disappear. This application was never intended that it would act as oprevdové battleship, indeed, at the time of the initiation of their construction was paying more restrictions on tonnage, and a real battleship within the limits I couldn't stand up.
This simplification is, unfortunately, a common and frequent even in the authors of the "literature of fact" about journalists not to mention. Just compare the numbers of divisions and "have done", that is nonsense because combat values are significantly different eludes them. It that the army has problems to be in repair techniques (typically soviets) and thus is not able to come back quickly technique back is often beyond their understanding. The economic ability of the country, that I do not understand at all, that the army must eat, get ammo, weapons and even the mail is beyond their ability to reasoning, in fact, these activities occupy more of people than fighting, and are often more difficult to control. Just get a good look at should be fleet WH, and anyone who imagines what the job is worth to keep such a diverse system in operation must stand up the hair on the head.
Just compare mechanically the numbers is nonsense, in addition to be the French a considerable part of his army could deploy on a pretty narrow part of the territory because of the fortifications (through various narratives for bolshevik) it has complied with its role and the germans held off, just a mechanical comparison is about anything, much more depends on other conditions. An example would be a comparison of the two men, one is a six-foot metrákový man and the other a wren meter sixty-five, mechanical srobnání is clear, winning is the first, in the real world but maybe it will show that the other is a boxer welterové weight and habán that gets on the pay phone, probably works mechanical comparison .

To what he writes Bitaxe one specific example. In the year 1945, Army Service Forces - ASF , thus loosely translated, the Army rear services to approximately 3 095 000 men and women, from the
1 384 000 outside the territory of the united states and that of the total 5 848 537, soldier US Army, so more than half..

Even to those guns caliber 280 mm. Somewhere / in a serious literature / I read that the germans in 1937, they weren't able to a larger caliber marine works to produce. ????? Somewhat back then I was surprised..

In.With.Army is probably one extreme, a WWII one soldier in direct contact with the enemy (i.e. a pawn somewhere in the field) it seemed to allegedly 8 soldiers who never fired a shot (as you týlaři support of combat units directly under the divisions and regiments. Reverse it (about) I think it was with the soviets, where apparently those operationally deployed was a higher percentage, but I'm afraid that even there it was a prevailing number of "nestřílejících" Indeed, hundreds of thousands of HiWis in the German services were precisely those non-combat components (only a smaller part of them has been deployed in combat)..

From historians exact and jednotké answers to this question you won't get, almost lez say, "what the historian's point of view". then we can generalize the nationalities - according to where in the melee he fell to his state, or ideology (bolshevik interpretation of history).
While historians agree can not, can be taken into account by the political establishment of this data (of course also varies from state to state). Since we were the republic of the czechoslovak should be binding the date, which set the politicians of this republic.
16.12.1941, released čs. the exile government in London, a statement that "a state of war between our republic and Germany takes from the moment the German government has committed violent acts against the security, independence and territorial integrity of the Czechoslovak republic".
23.2.1944, established a ministry-in-exile foreign to the initiation of hostilities occurred 17.9.1938 - in this day began to Konrad Henlein in the German territory of the mold unit Sudetendeutsche Freikorps.
because Germany these units on its territory vyzbrojilo, taught, and under the command of members of SS and SA is aired with terrorist tasks in the territory of a neighboring state, received pursuant to international law with this state to a state of war. A previous fight in the rebellion henleinovců in the days 12. 15. September were considered from a legal point of view for čs. internal political matter, although the coup was organizationally and materially supported from Germany.

so the czechoslovak answer to the question when the CZECHOSLOVAK republic began to fight with Germany the Second world war - should be politically set date 17. September 1938.

It's a few years since I've wrote in some discussion, that from a certain point of view (just because of the freikorpsům - that they should support the official. German jobs - I read somewhere that it has a foothold in some kind of document of the league of nations) we were in a state of war with Germany just from those events in the border region..

This is true to some extent, but only to a certain extent. There are at least two groups of factors, when one is really not - the first is the beginning of the war - for example, during the first months of the war (this time, I'm imagining it, don't take me literally) with no ability to replace losses is not reflected, because some time it takes, than the country ever goes to war economy, etc. So at the beginning of the war plays a role only what the state has, not what it is able to theoretically produce half of the year. Well and if it is this superiority (I don't mean, of course, just the numbers, but overall, qualitative) sufficient to one side quickly prevailed, on the "ability to reproduce" will never happen... Example - should be the russo-japanese war of 1905.

And the second, related, case, when it is much more important what the state is than what it is able to build, for example, is the navy, when the construction of large ships, it takes just some time and hard to stand up for the week. And if it is this time so long, that the order of magnitude corresponding to the duration of the war, so just don't stand a chance disproportion to catch up, not to mention that the enemy will probably build more ships at a similar pace as you. And it surely isn't a case of just the navy.



I wonder if, on the basis of their method used to calculate the "reproduction capability" out of its author to the fact that the USSR had an incredibly high, even if he didn't know that the USSR actually proved .

The production capacity of its economy to the germans were well aware, therefore, tried (if they had the chance) to choose a fight that would be fast and that is economically managed. The important thing is that after the fight from the enemy's economy became economy usable (and both the source means) and deeper economic abilities of the winner. The armament of CZECHOSLOVAK army, has allowed to build a couple of dozen divisions of the WH, and the economy of the CZECHOSLOVAK republic in the framework of Germany was not negligible, like the economy of France, so after winning the clash of Germany grew stronger and stronger and economically. Just that the comparison is problematic even in this (it's not mechanically compare the performances, because of the changing structure of production)
In the case of ships is enough otherwise, the allies (britoví and americans) were building ships the necessary classes much faster than the germans, moreover, have introduced new classes of ships (corvettes and frigates) which replaced the considerably more expensive destroyers in anti-submarine warfare around the convoys. Also accompanying the aircraft carrier were built much faster than any letadlovky before the war (the germans, incidentally, have not completed even one). It is on the serial construction of ships of Liberty probably also considerably changed the balance of forces in the Atlantic. Unlike kapy I just saw this as a fundamental economic difference between the allies and Germany, the construction of the ships is a pretty clear example of economic strength or weakness of the state. Similarly, it is necessary to kavntitativně even in armored vehicles, trucks and other weapons, but the ship is a nice example .

I wouldn't be surprised. First it was the German maritime industry's only limited by Versaille (and the production of the heavy works of the terms of the contract I think the limit) and, secondly, the causing of bankruptcy in general - if I remember correctly the information I somewhere saw, Britain was in 1918, 16 factories capable to produce guns of 8" (203mm) and more, in 1938 it was only one factory (and not the production capacity of the armor, so the plates have ordered mj from Vítkovice)..

17.9.1938 is a nice date, we can talk about czechoslovak. - German conflict, but if it ma be a world war, so I guess I hold more widely recognized term - of September, 1939, or maybe even more precisely 1.9.1939, when from a local central european conflict became world war iii. But that's just my opinion..

if you want to take this, so pedantically speaking, only 3.9. the entry of the United kingdom and the French republic with colonies outside of Europe is from a local european conflict became a world conflict. although I think that čínanů or japanese, you with September 1939, the power failed.

But I don't want to start a discussion about who it is that date correct, I already commented on above. For myself I 17.9.1938, just for the memory of those who in these battles fell, while in our own history books it says we give up without a fight. I really don't understand why is this untruth continues to spread..

But no, a bit of a stickler I don't want to be me best suited, more generally, of September, 1939, and also due to the entry of the USSR into the war. And zapominát to those who died in the autumn of 1938, or at other times I definitely don't want. It would boys they didn't deserve..

Kapa nemas pravdu, ekonomika statu a vubec celkove hospodareni armady je to co cini rozdil mezi excelentni armadou a prumernou. Napr. americka armada svoji logistikou dokaze soutezit se soukromymi spolecnostmi, ktere napr. jdou v USA do takovych extremu, ze zakazuji svym ridicum zatacet vlevo a diky GPS planuji cestu tak, aby v ni bylo minimalni mnozstvi odbocovani vlevo. Logiku veci a ekonomicke vyhody ponecham na kazdem.


Co se tyce pocatku valky - prave tady naopak je videt, jak silna je ekonomika statu. Protoze valka se nestane ze dne na den, je to dlouhodobejsi proces ochlazovani vztahu, ktery vyusti ve valku a prave tady potrebujes ten potencial nastartovat - srovnej start USA po Pearl Harboru a srovnej start Francie po Mnichovu, po prepadeni Polska
Naprosto neporovnatelny kategorie, ktery ovlivnili vysledek valky, pokud by Francie byla schopna nastartovat svuj potencial podobne jako USA, troufam si rici, ze vysledek Bitvy of Francii by mohl byt dost jiny - uvedomme si, ze tehdejsi potencial Nemecka jeste nebyl velky. Ona treba i rychlost mobilizace je jednoznacne dana hospodarstvim - potrebujes auta na prepravu, potrebujes vyzbroj, vystroj, potraviny, ubytovaci prostory, apod. Srovnej mobilizaci v pripade VYSPELE ekonomiky CSR a napr. mobilizaci Belgie at srovnavame stejne velike zeme. Podobne srovnej mobilizaci napr. Britanie a Francie.


S tou Rusko-Japonskou valkou nemas pravdu, to je prave ukazka, jak ekonomika rozhodla - valka se dostala do dost pozicni faze (dost podobne WW I.) a co rozhodla byla dynamika ekonomiky a logistiky Japonska. Japonci byli schopni produkovat lode rychleji cimz elimonovali lodstvo a podporu jednotek a i prestoze na zemi to s nima nevypadalo ruzove tu valku nakonec zlomili. Navic s tim jejich logistika na zemi byla rozhodne vykonnejsi nez napr. ruska, stejne tak prisun zaloh, apod..


Ekonomika neni pouze o tom, kolik toho vyrobis, ale take o nerostnych surovinach (strategie Japonska za WW II. byla pouze a jenom pouze definovana ekonomikou), poctu lidi (napr. SSSR), rozlehlosti uzemi, geografii apod.

Jinak ohledne te reprodukce pokud pamatujes asi pred rokem jsem tady v jeden diskuzi uvedl data rustu HDP, ze kterych plynulo, ze ekonomika SSSR udola samotne Nemecko. To, ze Nemci anektovali dalsi uzemi uz pak roli zmenilo. Proto Nemecko hodne stalo o CSR ono pridani nejakych 30% moderniho hospodarstvi dost zahyba s produkcnimi moznostmi zeme.


NAvic s tim ano podle ekonomiky muzes predpovedet jak valka dopadne - Japonci to udelali a valka dopadla jak Jamamoto predpokladal Jamamoto byl jeden z mala generalu, ktery rozumel vyssi strategii (tedy byl jednim z mala vojaku, kteri jsou multidisciplinarni) tedy i ekonomickym vazbam (aby ne studoval v USA), takze vedel, ze Japonsko nema potencial vyhrat valku s USA pokud to nebude rychla valka. Proto hoodne ovlivnil celkovou strategii - okupace nerostnych surovin Indonesie, Filipiny, Malajsie (Japonsko je zemi BEZ JAKYCHKOLI SUROVIN) a take podle nekterych prilis agresivni a zbrkle strategii. Jenze opet on videl valku v sirsim kontextu, coz napr. Guderian nevidel - ten konstatoval ano Rusko ma tusim neco kolem 25000 tanku, ktere lehce znicime. Nicmene mu nedoslo, ze to znamena, ze Rusko ma potencial TAKOVATO cisla vyrabet, tedy ma mnohem vetsi potencial a koeficient reprodukce. Navic jeho fanaticke lpeni na tezkych tancich, pro ktere Nemecko nemelo vyrobni potencial take udelalo sve. Mozna kdyby se misto techle tezkych tanku vyrabeli tezka protitankova dela a levne bojove prostredky tak, jak to udelali Rusove tak valka vypadala taky jinak - nastesti pro nas nemecti generalove naprosto nerozumeli ekonomickym potrebam.


Apod. samozrejme uvedl jsem to ve zjednodusenem principu, je spousta vyjimek, apod. nicmene bavime se o konvecnich valkach mezi dvema staty v kontextu svetovych konfliktu. Ne nejake africke kmenove valky, apod.


P.S. Jeste k tem lodim - delal jsi nekdy srovnani nakladu ponorkoveho boje? Priznam se, ze jsem to jednou udelal asi pred 5 rokama a vychazela dost zajimava cisla. Pokud jenom vezmes, ze v dobe nejsilnejsich uspechu ponorek ztraceli USA a Britanie na 1 potopenou ponorku neco kolem 15-20 lodi, do toho zapocitas naklady na protiponorkova opatreni, naklady prevazene tonaze, apod. tak to byli dost zajimavy cisla. Donitz tady mel jednoznacne pravdu ponorkova valka by znicila samotnou Britanii behem chvile. Pouze diky ekonomicke sile USA, ktera v podstate podporovala sama sebe, SSSR a Britanii + Kanadu, plus zahranicni dobrovolniky CSR, Francie, Polsko, Nizozemi, apod. byla schopna Britanie a castecne i SSSR prezit.

myslim si, ze jsme se velmi odchylili od puvodniho tematu, kterym byl dotaz na stav jednotek na pocatku ww2, ktery byl z pohledu tazatele upresnen. Padla tady myslim jedna sada cisel, kterou jsme zhodnotili jako velmi nepresnou, nic dalsiho k dotazu nepadlo. Chapu diskusi nad ekonomickymi aspekty vedeni valky s cilem ilustrovat nesrovnatelnost pouhych tabulkovych stavu armad, ale bohuzel to neodpovida na polozeny dotaz.